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Why Has IPO Underpricing 
Changed Over Time? 
Tim Loughran and Jay Ritter* 
In the 1980s, the average first-day return on initial public offerings (IPOs) was 7%. The 
average first-day return doubled to almost 15% during 1990-1998, before jumping to 65% 
during the internet bubble years of 1999-2000 and then reverting to 12% during 2001-2003. 
We attribute much of the higher underpricing during the bubble period to a changing issuer 
objective function. We argue that in the later periods there was less focus on maximizing IPO 
proceeds due to an increased emphasis on research coverage. Furthermore, allocations of 
hot IPOs to the personal brokerage accounts of issuing firm executives created an incentive 
to seek rather than avoid underwriters with a reputation for severe underpricing. 
What explains the severe underpricing of initial public offerings in 1999-2000, when the average 
first-day return of 65% exceeded any level previously seen before? In this article, we address 
this and the related question of why IPO underpricing doubled from 7% during 1980-1989 to 
almost 15% during 1990-1998 before reverting to 12% during the post-bubble period of 2001- 
2003. Our goal is to explain low-frequency movements in underpricing (or first-day returns) that 
occur less often than hot and cold issue markets. 
We examine three hypotheses for the change in underpricing: 1) the changing risk composition 
hypothesis, 2) the realignment of incentives hypothesis, and 3) a new hypothesis, the changing 
issuer objective function hypothesis. The changing issuer objective function hypothesis has 
two components, the spinning hypothesis and the analyst lust hypothesis. 
The changing risk composition hypothesis, introduced by Ritter (1984), assumes that riskier 
IPOs will be underpriced by more than less-risky IPOs. This prediction follows from models 
where underpricing arises as an equilibrium condition to induce investors to participate in the 
IPO market. If the proportion of IPOs that represent risky stocks increases, there should be 
greater average underpricing. Risk can reflect either technological or valuation uncertainty. 
Although there have been some changes in the characteristics of firms going public, these 
changes are found to be too minor to explain much of the variation in underpricing over time if 
there is a stationary risk-return relation. 
The realignment of incentives and the changing issuer objective function hypotheses both 
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posit changes over time in the willingness of issuing firms to accept underpricing. Both 
hypotheses assume that underwriters benefit from rent-seeking behavior that occurs when 
there is excessive underpricing. 
The realignment of incentives hypothesis, introduced by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), 
argues that the managers of issuing firms acquiesced in leaving money on the table during 
the 1999-2000 bubble period. (Money on the table is the change between the offer price and 
the first closing market price, multiplied by the number of shares sold.) The hypothesized 
reasons for the increased acquiescence are reduced chief executive officer (CEO) ownership, 
fewer IPOs containing secondary shares, increased ownership fragmentation, and an 
increased frequency and size of “friends and family” share allocations. These changes made 
issuing firm decision-makers less motivated to bargain for a higher offer price. 
The realignment of incentives hypothesis is similar to the changing risk composition 
hypothesis in that it is changes in the characteristics of ownership, rather than any 
nonstationarities in the pricing relations, that are associated with changes in average 
underpricing. It differs from the changing risk composition hypothesis, however, in that 
underpricing is not determined solely by the investor demand side of the market. 
In our empirical work, we find little support for the realignment of incentives hypothesis as 
an explanation for substantial changes in underpricing. We find no relation between the 
inclusion of secondary shares in an IPO and underpricing. And although CEO fractional 
ownership was lower during the internet bubble period, the CEO dollar ownership (the market 
value of the CEO’s holdings) was substantially higher, resulting in increased incentives to 
avoid underpricing. Furthermore, it is possible that changes in the characteristics of 
ownership may be partly a response to higher underpricing as well as a cause. Ljungqvist 
and Wilhelm (2003) do not provide an explanation for why these changes occurred. 
The changing issuer objective function hypothesis argues that, holding constant the 
level of managerial ownership and other characteristics, issuing firms became more willing to 
accept underpricing. We hypothesize that, during our sample period, there are two reasons 
for why issuers became more willing to leave money on the table. The first reason is an 
increased emphasis on analyst coverage. As issuers placed more importance on hiring a lead 
underwriter with a highly ranked analyst to cover the firm, they became less concerned 
about avoiding underwriters with a reputation for excessive underpricing. We call this desire 
to hire an underwriter with an influential but bullish analyst the analyst lust hypothesis. 
This results in each issuer facing a local oligopoly of underwriters, no matter how many 
competing underwriters there are in total, because there are typically only five Institutional 
Investor all-star analysts covering any industry. As Hoberg (2003) shows, the more market 
power that underwriters have, the more underpricing there will be in equilibrium. 
The second reason for a greater willingness to leave money on the table by issuers is the 
co-opting of decision-makers through side payments. Beginning in the 1990s, underwriters 
set up personal brokerage accounts for venture capitalists and the executives of issuing 
firms in order to allocate hot IPOs to them. By the end of the decade, this practice, known as 
spinning, had become commonplace. The purpose of these side payments is to influence the 
issuer’s choice of lead underwriter. These payments create an incentive to seek, rather than 
avoid, underwriters with a reputation for severe underpricing. We call this the spinning 
hypothesis. In the post-bubble period, increased regulatory scrutiny reduced spinning 
dramatically. This is one of several explanations why underpricing dropped back to an average 
of 12%. The reduction in spinning removed the incentive for issuers to choose investment 
bankers who underprice. Investment bankers responded by underpricing less in the post- 
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The contributions of our research are three-fold. First, we develop the changing issuer 
objective function hypothesis for the increased underpricing of IPOs during the 1990s and 
the bubble periods. Second, we document many patterns regarding the evolution of the US 
IPO market during the last two decades. Much of the data has been or will be posted on a 
website for other researchers to use. Many, although not all, of these patterns have been 
previously documented, especially for the first two subperiods. Third, we formally test the 
ability of the changing risk composition, realignment of incentives, and changing issuer 
objective function hypotheses to explain the changes in underpricing from 1980-1989 (“the 
1980s”) to 1990-1998 (“the 1990s”), 1999-2000 (“the internet bubble”), and 2001-2003 (“the 
post-bubble period”). 
Much of the increased underpricing in the bubble period is consistent with the predictions 
of the changing issuer objective function hypothesis. In multiple regression tests, the 
changing risk composition and the realignment of incentives hypotheses have little success 
at explaining the increase in first-day returns from the 1980s to the 1990s, to the bubble 
period, or to the post-bubble period. The regression results show that only part of the 
increase in the bubble period is attributable to the increased fraction of tech and internet 
stocks going public. Consistent with the changing issuer objective function hypothesis, 
underpricing became much more severe when there was a top-tier lead underwriter in the 
latter time periods. These conclusions are not substantially altered after controlling for the 
endogeneity of underwriter choice. 
The rest of this article is as follows. In Section I, we present our changing issuer objective 
function hypothesis. In Section II, we describe our data. In Section III, we report year-by- 
year mean and median first-day returns and valuations. In Section IV, we report average first- 
day returns for various univariate sorts. In Section V, we report multiple regression results 
with first-day returns as the dependent variable. Section VI discusses alternative explanations 
for the high underpricing of IPOs during the internet bubble period. Section VII presents our 
conclusions. Four appendices provide detailed descriptions of our data on founding dates, 
post-issue shares outstanding, underwriter rankings, and internet IPO identification. 
I. Causes of a Changing Issuer Objective Function 
Most models of IPO underpricing are based on asymmetric information. There are two 
agency explanations of underpricing in the IPO literature. Baron (1982) presents a model of 
underpricing where issuers delegate the pricing decision to underwriters. Investment bankers 
find it less costly to market an IPO that is underpriced. Loughran and Ritter (2002) instead 
emphasize the quid pro quos that underwriters receive from buy-side clients in return for 
allocating underpriced IPOs to them. The managers of issuing firms care less about 
underpricing if they are simultaneously receiving good news about their personal wealth 
increasing. This argument, however, does not explain why issuers hire underwriters who will 
ex post exploit issuers’ psychology. Neither does the realignment of incentives hypothesis. 
One can view issuers as seeking to maximize a weighted average of IPO proceeds, the 
proceeds from future sales (both insider sales and follow-on offerings), and side payments 
from underwriters to the people who will choose the lead underwriter: 
α1IPO Proceeds + α2Proceeds from Future Sales + (1 - α1 - α2)Side Payments      (1)  Financial Management • Autumn 2004  8 
The changing issuer objective function hypothesis states that issuers choosing an 
underwriter in some periods put less weight on IPO proceeds and more weight on the proceeds 
from future sales and side payments. 
In Equation (1), IPO proceeds are a function of the choice of underwriter and underwriting 
contract (auction or bookbuilding) at the start of the process and, several months later, the 
bargaining at the pricing meeting for IPOs when bookbuilding is used. Loughran and Ritter 
(2002) provide a prospect theory analysis of the bargaining at the pricing meeting. The 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) realignment of incentives hypothesis can also be viewed as 
a theory of the bargaining at the pricing meeting. Neither of these theories, though, explains 
why an issuing firm would choose an underwriter that would, at the pricing meeting, propose 
an offer price that leaves more money on the table than necessary. In contrast, the changing 
issuer objective function hypothesis does provide a theory for the choice of underwriter at 
the start of the process. Before discussing the analyst lust and spinning hypotheses in more 
detail, we explain why underwriters want to underprice. 
A. Why Underwriters Want to Underprice IPOs 
Underwriters, as intermediaries, advise the issuer on pricing the issue, both at the time of 
issuing a preliminary prospectus that includes a file price range, and at the pricing meeting 
when the final offer price is set. If underwriters receive compensation from both the issuer 
(the gross spread) and investors, they have an incentive to recommend a lower offer price 
than if the compensation was merely the gross spread. 
Bookbuilding is the mechanism used to price and allocate IPOs for 99.9% of our sample, 
with auctions used for the other 0.1%. In the case of bookbuilding, underwriters can decide 
to whom to allocate shares if there is excess demand. Benveniste and Wilhelm (1997) and 
Sherman and Titman (2002) emphasize that underwriter discretion can be used to the benefit 
of issuing firms. Underwriters can reduce the average amount of underpricing, thereby 
increasing the expected proceeds to issuers, by favoring regular investors who provide 
information about their demand that is useful in pricing an IPO. Shares can be allocated to 
those who are likely to be buy-and-hold investors, minimizing any costs associated with 
price support. 
Underwriter discretion can completely eliminate the winner’s curse problem if underwriters 
allocate shares in hot issues only to those investors who are willing to buy other IPOs. As 
Ritter and Welch (2002) note, if underwriters used their discretion to bundle IPOs, problems 
caused by asymmetric information could be nearly eliminated. The resulting average level of 
underpricing should then be no more than several percent. Thus, given the use of 
bookbuilding, the joint hypothesis that issuers desire to maximize their proceeds and that 
underwriters act in the best interests of issuers can be rejected whenever average 
underpricing exceeds several percent. 
Although underwriter discretion in allocating IPOs can be desirable for issuing firms, it 
can also be disadvantageous if conflict of interest problems are not controlled. Underwriters 
acknowledge that in the late 1990s IPOs were allocated to investors largely on the basis of 
past and future commission business on other trades. In 1998-2000, for example, Robertson 
Stephens allocated IPOs to institutional clients almost exclusively on the basis of the amount 
of commission business generated during the prior 18 months, according to its January 9, 
2003 settlement with the NASD and SEC. Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) received 
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from certain hot IPOs, such as the December 1999 IPO of VA Linux.1 The VA Linux IPO was 
priced at $30 per share, with a 7% gross spread equal to $2.10 per share. For an investor who 
was allocated shares at $30, and who then sold at the closing market price of $239.25, the 
capital gains would have amounted to $209.25 per share. If the investor then traded shares to 
generate commissions of one-half of this profit, the total underwriter compensation per 
share was $2.10 plus $104.625, or $106.725. 
The receipt of commissions by underwriting firms in return for hot IPO allocations violates 
NASD Rule 2110 on “Free Riding and Withholding.” Because the underwriter has an economic 
interest (a share of the profits) in the IPO after it has been allocated, there is not a “full 
distribution” of the security. This is economically equivalent to withholding shares and 
selling them at a price higher than the offer price, in violation of Rule 2110. But if the NASD 
(a self-regulatory organization) did not enforce its rules, underwriters might find it optimal to 
violate the rules. Evidence consistent with commission business affecting IPO allocations is 
contained in Reuter (2004). 
The willingness of buy-side clients to generate commissions by sending trades to integrated 
securities firms depends on the amount of money left on the table in IPOs. Underwriters have an 
incentive to underprice IPOs if they receive commission business in return for leaving money on 
the table. But the incentive to underprice presumably would have been as great in the 1980s as 
during the internet bubble period, unless there was a “supply” shift in the willingness of firms to 
hire underwriters with a history of underpricing. We argue that such a shift did indeed occur, 
resulting in increased underpricing. 
B. The Analyst Lust Explanation of Underpricing 
We hypothesize that issuing firms have increasingly chosen their lead underwriter largely 
on the basis of expected analyst coverage. Providing research coverage is expensive for 
investment bankers; the largest brokerage firms each spent close to $1 billion per year on 
equity research during the bubble (Rynecki, 2002). These costs are covered partly by charging 
issuers of securities explicit (gross spread) and implicit (underpricing) fees. The more that 
issuing firms see analyst coverage as important, the more they are willing to pay these costs. 
There are several reasons for our opinion that analyst lust was more important during the 
1990s and bubble period than in the 1980s. First, the investment bankers and venture 
capitalists we have talked to are unanimous in their agreement. Supporting this, in the early 
1970s Morgan Stanley had “no research business to speak of,” even though it was a major 
IPO underwriter (Schack, 2002). As we will show, the number of managing underwriters in 
1See the January 22, 2002 SEC litigation release 17327 and news release (available on the SEC website at 
http://www.sec.gov), and the NASD Regulation news release (available at http://www.nasdr.com). The NASD 
Regulation news release states that “For example, after a CSFB customer obtained an allocation of 13,500 shares 
in the VA Linux IPO, the customer sold two million shares of Compaq and paid CSFB $.50 a share—or $1 
million—as a purported brokerage commission. The customer immediately repurchased the shares through other 
firms at normal commission rates of $.06 per share at a loss of $1.2 million on the Compaq sale and repurchase 
because of the $1 million paid to CSFB. On that same day, however, the customer sold the VA Linux IPO shares, 
making a one-day profit of $3.3 million.” 
 According to paragraphs 48 and 49 of the SEC complaint, for the July 20, 1999 IPO of Gadzoox, which CSFB 
lead managed, “at least 261,025 shares were allocated to customers that were willing to funnel a portion of their 
IPO profits to CSFB.” CSFB distributed approximately 3.4 million of the 4.025 million offer, which went from 
an offer price of $21 to a closing price of $74.8125, up 256%. The following day, July 21, 1999, CSFB was the 
lead manager on MP3, which was priced at $28 and closed at $63.3125, up 126%. “CSFB distributed 7.2 million 
of the 10.35 million MP3 shares offered through underwriters. Of the 7.2 million MP3 shares distributed by 
CSFB, at least 520,170 shares were allocated to customers that were willing to funnel a portion of their trading 
profits to CSFB.”  Financial Management • Autumn 2004  10 
IPO syndicates has increased over time. Investment bankers note that co-managers are 
included in a syndicate almost exclusively to provide research coverage. Indeed, by 2000 co- 
managers were generally not even invited to participate in road shows and the pricing meeting 
at which the final offer price is determined. 
Second, as valuations have increased, changes in growth rates perceived in the financial 
markets represent more dollars. Firm value can be decomposed into the value of existing 
assets in place plus the net present value of growth opportunities. As the value of growth 
opportunities increases relative to the value of assets in place, issuing firms come to place 
more importance on analyst coverage. In 1982, for example, when the market price-earnings 
(PE) ratio was about 8, the difference in valuation for a firm with forecasted growth of 10% 
versus 15% might translate into a difference in PEs of 8 versus 12. In 1999, when the market 
PE was about 25, the difference in valuation for forecasted growth of 10% versus 15% might 
translate into a difference in PEs of 25 versus 40. For a firm with $1.00 in earnings per share, 
in 1982 the difference in values would have been $4 per share, but in 1999 it would be $15. 
A final reason for the increased importance of analyst coverage in the bubble period is the 
greater visibility of analyst recommendations because of the internet and cable television 
stations such as CNBC. Consistent with this statement, Busse and Green (2002, Table 5) 
report that trading volume for Nasdaq stocks during June through October 2000 increased 
by an average of 300,000 shares in the four minutes after an analyst mentioned a stock 
favorably on CNBC’s Midday Call segment. 
The analyst lust hypothesis does not necessarily assume any conflict of interest between 
managers and other pre-issue shareholders. If favorable analyst coverage results in a higher 
market price, all pre-issue shareholders benefit. 
There is ample supporting evidence for this analyst lust hypothesis. Dunbar (2000) presents 
evidence that underwriters in 1984-1994 subsequently increased their IPO market share if 
they had an analyst who was highly ranked in the Institutional Investor (II) annual survey. 
Clarke, Dunbar, and Kahle (2003, Table 2) report that investment banks gaining an II all-star 
analyst subsequently boosted their market share of IPOs in the analyst’s industry; the 
changes were greater in 1995-1999 than in 1988-1994. The Krigman, Shaw, and Womack 
(2001) survey of issuing firms finds that one of the most important reasons to switch 
underwriters in a seasoned offering is to seek additional and influential analyst coverage 
from the new banker. Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2003) analyze the determinants of 
lead underwriter choice for debt and follow-on equity offerings conducted during December 
1993 through June 2002. They report that the presence of an II all-star analyst in the issuing 
firm’s industry increases the probability of that underwriter being chosen as the lead, holding 
constant that bank’s fraction of the issuer’s equity deals during the prior five years. 
Hong and Kubik (2003) report that analysts making optimistic forecasts are more likely to 
move to a higher-status brokerage firm if they change jobs. Furthermore, analysts whose 
employer underwrites stocks that they cover are more likely to be forced out, the less optimistic 
their forecasts are. Hong and Kubik report that these biases became even stronger in the 
1999-2000 period. Discussions with executives of firms going public in 2001-2003 suggest 
that analyst coverage is still an important determinant of underwriter choice, in spite of the 
Global Settlement restrictions on analyst participation in IPOs. 
Cliff and Denis (2004) test the analyst lust hypothesis using a sample of 1,050 US firms 
conducting IPOs during 1993-2000 that subsequently conducted at least one follow-on equity 
offering during 1993-2001. They find that issuers are less likely to switch underwriters for 
their first SEO if there had been greater underpricing, and if the IPO underwriter’s analyst 
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instrument, they report that having an all-star analyst in the industry of the issuing firm at 
the time of the IPO is associated with first-day returns that are 16.3% higher. Furthermore, 
their subperiod results show higher incremental underpricing associated with hiring an 
underwriter with an II all-star covering the firm in the bubble period than earlier. 
The evidence in all these studies is consistent with the analyst lust hypothesis, and those 
that report subperiod results find that the effects were stronger in the late 1990s when 
valuations were highest, just as we predict. 
C. The Spinning Explanation of Underpricing 
In 1999-2000, the average amount of money left on the table of $85 million per IPO adds up 
to $68 billion (in dollars of 2003 purchasing power), which seems way too high to be justified 
as equilibrium compensation for purchasing analyst coverage. This raises two questions. 
First, if issuing firms wanted to purchase analyst coverage, why did they pay for it by 
leaving money on the table, rather than paying a higher gross spread? Second, why did they 
leave so much money on the table? 
Our answers are as follows. First, money on the table is state-contingent compensation; 
the deals leaving a lot of money on the table were the deals where the managers of issuing 
firms found themselves facing a substantial increase in their personal wealth (Loughran and 
Ritter, 2002). Second, with bookbuilding, underwriters have discretion over the allocation of 
hot IPOs. Some shares went to “friends and family” of the issuing firm, as Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2003) show. But some shares also went to the executives of issuing firms and their 
venture capitalists through personal brokerage accounts (Siconolfi, 1997). 
In this article, we introduce a new agency explanation for IPO underpricing, the spinning 
hypothesis, which is based on a conflict of interest between decision-makers and other pre-IPO 
shareholders. It posits that decision-makers are willing to hire underwriters with a history of 
underpricing because the decision-makers receive side payments.2 The decision-makers are the 
individuals who choose the managing underwriters, especially the lead underwriter, for an IPO. 
These decision-makers are the general partners of the lead venture capital firm (if a firm is financed 
with venture capital money) and the top managers of the issuing firm. The other pre-issue 
shareholders are the limited partners of venture capital firms and other minority shareholders. 
Elkind and Gimein (2001) describe the “Friend of Frank” brokerage accounts set up for decision- 
makers by CSFB, where Frank Quattrone, head of technology investment banking, worked: 
[I]n the 1990s firms also began offering shares to potential clients... by setting up brokerage 
accounts specifically for hot IPOs. Under these arrangements, VCs and entrepreneurs made 
a moderate deposit (perhaps $250,000) and signed over discretionary authority to the brokers 
whose firms were seeking their favor. Typically, IPO shares would be flipped for a quick— 
and riskless—windfall. “The stock would go into the hands of venture capitalists and the 
managements of companies that were going to go public next,” notes a Silicon Valley fund 
manager. “This was the closest thing to free money that there was. It may not be all that much 
different from a briefcase filled with unmarked tens and 20s.”...Indeed, two Silicon Valley 
CEOs, who asked that their names not be used, said that because several competing 
investment banks were offering them cheap IPO shares, they could not have been influenced 
2On April 28, 2003, the “global settlement” between ten top investment banking firms and the NASD, NYSE, 
SEC, and the states, coordinated by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, imposed a “no spinning” rule that 
prohibits officers and directors who are in a position to “greatly influence” investment banking decisions from 
receiving IPO allocations. Proposed NASD Rule 2712 addresses spinning and both clarifies and strengthens 
NASD Rule 2710.  Financial Management • Autumn 2004  12 
when choosing between them. 
The March 7, 2003 San Jose Mercury News lists, by name and company affiliation, 63 
Silicon Valley executives who had “Friends of Frank” accounts at CSFB. The median executive 
received first-day capital gains of $538,000 from IPO allocations.3 
Payments like this to individuals motivate the managers of an issuing firm to choose an 
underwriter with a reputation for leaving money on the table. This spinning theory of IPO 
underpricing explains why underwriters and issuing firm managers prefer to forego net 
proceeds by leaving money on the table, rather than pay a higher gross spread. Money on 
the table is the currency by which underwriters can influence other venture capitalists and 
issuing firm executives; gross spread revenue cannot be redistributed except in a more 
transparent manner. 
If spinning is an important reason for underpricing in the bubble period, why wasn’t it 
important a decade earlier? In the 1980s, relatively little money was left on the table in IPOs 
because valuations were low and analyst coverage was not perceived to be as important as 
it became in the 1990s. As IPO underpricing increased over time, we hypothesize that the use 
of hot IPOs to reward decision-makers created an incentive for decision-makers to seek out 
underwriters known to leave money on the table, rather than to avoid such underwriters. 
Allocating these hot IPOs to the decision-makers of issuing companies and their friends 
(through friends and family accounts) allowed underwriters to underprice even more. In 
other words, underpricing fed on itself. In this regard, both our changing issuer objective 
function and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm’s (2003) realignment of incentives hypotheses are 
similar: Underpricing creates incentives for even more underpricing. What constrains 
underpricing from increasing without limit is that raising money is still a goal for an issuer. 
II. Data 
Our primary data source for IPOs over 1980-2003 is the Thomson Financial Securities Data 
(also known as Securities Data Co.) new issues database. We have made hundreds of 
corrections to this database, and we have collected missing information for thousands of 
observations from a number of sources, including prospectuses; Howard and Co.’s Going 
Public: The IPO Reporter for IPOs over 1980-1985; Dealogic for IPOs after 1990; and the 
SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval (EDGAR) system for IPOs after 1996 (final 
prospectuses are identified on EDGAR as document 424B at http://www.sec.gov).4 
In all of our analysis, we exclude best efforts offers (typically very small offerings, these 
are not covered by Thomson Financial Securities Data); ADRs (American Depository 
Receipts, issued by foreign firms that list in at least one other market outside the US); 
closed-end funds; REITs (real estate investment trusts); banks and savings and loans (S&Ls); 
partnerships; and firms not covered by CRSP within six months of the offering. We also 
exclude IPOs with an offer price below $5.00 per share. What remains are almost all IPOs of 
3Descriptions and evidence regarding spinning are presented in a number of additional sources. Smith (2002) 
describes the allocation of IPOs to top executives by Goldman Sachs. Smith, Grimes, Zuckerman, and Scannell 
(2002) describe the allocations to venture capitalists, and Sherburne (2002) lists the allocations to WorldCom 
officers and directors and to other telecom executives by Citigroup’s Salomon Smith Barney unit. 
4While Thomson Financial’s database is missing some assets and sales data, and many founding dates, we find no 
evidence of any backfilling bias. That is, there is no evidence that subsequent “winners” are more comprehensively 
or accurately covered than other IPOs, so researchers using this database should not worry about introducing a 
survivorship bias. Loughran & Ritter • Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?  13 
domestic operating companies that are large enough to be of interest to institutional investors. 
The sample size is 6,391 firms, although in some of the tables we are missing up to 6% of the 
sample because of incomplete information. 
The main source of information on venture capital backing is Thomson Financial. 
Supplemental data on venture capital backing has been provided by Chris Barry, Paul Gompers, 
and Josh Lerner. 
Information on the founding date of companies comes from a variety of sources, discussed 
in more detail in Appendix A. Laura Field, Alexander Ljungqvist, and Li-Anne Woo provided 
many of the founding dates. We are missing a reliable founding date for 120 firms. 
The original file price range for IPOs over 1980-1982 is transcribed from Howard and Co.’s 
Going Public: The IPO Reporter. The file price range for IPOs from 1983 and later comes 
from Thomson Financial. We are missing the file price range for 11 firms in the early 1980s. 
To calculate the market value of an IPO, we use the offer price multiplied by the post-issue 
number of shares outstanding. For firms with a single class of shares outstanding, the 
primary source of data on the post-issue number of shares is CRSP. For firms with more than 
one class of shares outstanding (dual-class firms), we use data from a variety of sources, as 
described in Appendix B. 
Information on assets, sales, and earnings per share (EPS) in the year prior to going 
public comes mainly from Thomson Financial. When figures are available, we use sales and 
earnings per share for the most recent 12 months prior to going public. Otherwise, we use the 
most recent fiscal year numbers. Additional sources of information include Dealogic for 
post-1990 IPOs, Howard and Co.’s Going Public: The IPO Reporter for 1980-1985 IPOs, and 
EDGAR. If a firm has zero trailing sales, we assign a sales value of $0.01 million, since in our 
empirical work we use logarithms, and the logarithm of zero is undefined. If we are unsure 
whether sales are zero or are missing, we treat the value as missing. We are missing sales 
numbers for 85 firms and assets numbers for 223 firms. 
We use Thomson Financial Securities Data as our source for information on lead 
underwriters and the number of managing underwriters for each IPO. For underwriter prestige 
rankings, we start with the Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) 
rankings, and then create rankings for 1992-2003 in the spirit of their methodology. Appendix 
C provides a detailed description of the procedures. The underwriter prestige rankings are 
on a 0 to 9 scale, and are based on the pecking order seen in “tombstone” advertisements. In 
our empirical work, if there is more than one lead underwriter, we use the rank of the bookrunner 
or the highest-ranking joint bookrunner. 
Appendix D describes how we identify internet IPOs and lists the SIC codes that we use 
to categorize IPOs as a technology (tech) firm or not. 
III. Time-Series of First-Day Returns and Valuations 
Figure 1 plots the annual volume and average first-day return on IPOs over 1980-2003. 
Table I reports the means (Panel A) and medians (Panel B) of the first-day returns by year of 
issue and by subperiod. In all of our analysis, we split the sample into four subperiods: 
January 1980-December 1989 (“the 1980s”), January 1990-December 1998 (“the 1990s”), 
January 1999-December 2000 (“the internet bubble”), and January 2001-December 2003 (“the 
post-bubble period”). 
In the 1980s, the average first-day return was slightly over 7%. The average first-day 
return increased to almost 15% in the 1990s, and then jumped to 65% during the internet  Financial Management • Autumn 2004  14 
Figure 1. Number of IPOs (Bars) and Average First-Day Returns (Diamonds) by 
Cohort Year 
 
IPOs with an offer price below $5.00 per share, unit offers, REITs, closed-end funds, banks and S&Ls, 
ADRs, partnerships, and IPOs not listed on CRSP within six months of the offer date are excluded. Data 
are from Thomson Financial Securities Data and other sources, with corrections by authors. The first-day 
return is defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the closing price. The data plotted are 
reported in Panel A of Table I. 
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bubble. In the post-bubble period, annual IPO volume dropped to 80 issues or fewer with a 
mean first-day return of approximately 12%. 
Table I shows that from 1980 through 1994 the underpricing of IPOs was typically quite 
modest, as was the amount of money left on the table. In every year from 1995 through 2000, 
the average first-day return was higher than in any year between 1981 and 1994. Underpricing 
took a big jump in the bubble period, as did the amount of money left on the table. The 
number of managing underwriters increased steadily until 2003, with a rapid acceleration in 
the late 1990s. The conventional wisdom is that the growth in the number of managing 
underwriters is associated with greater emphasis on analyst coverage. 
For IPOs in the 1980s, Panel B reports that the median valuation of $72 million using the 
offer price was less than twice the annual sales of $38 million. In the 1990s, the market-to- 
sales ratio increased to 2.7 (median valuation of $122 million relative to median sales of $46 
million). During the internet bubble period, the median valuation using the offer price jumped 
to $387 million while the median sales fell to $15 million, for a market-to-sales ratio of 26. 
Using the valuation implied by the first closing market price, the market-to-sales ratio is even 
higher, at 38. This rapid escalation in market-to-sales ratios suggests that valuation 
uncertainty played a role in increased underpricing over time. In the post-bubble period, the 
market-to-sales ratio fell back to 2.4, approximately what it was in the 1990s. Loughran & Ritter • Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?  15 
Table I. Number of IPOs, First Day Returns, Number of Managing Underwriters, 
Amount of Money Left on the Table, Valuation Levels, and Sales by Cohort Year 
 
IPOs with an offer price below $5.00 per share, unit offers, REITs, closed-end funds, banks and S&Ls, ADRs, 
and IPOs not listed on CRSP within six months of issuing are excluded. Data are from Thomson Financial 
Securities Data, with supplements from Dealogic and other sources, and corrections by authors. The first-day 
return is defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the closing price. The number of domestic 
managing underwriters includes both lead underwriters and co-managers. Money on the table is defined as the 
first-day price change (offer price to close) times the number of shares issued (global offering amount, 
excluding overallotment options). Both valuation calculations use the post-issue number of shares outstanding. 
Valuations are computed by multiplying either the offer price or the first closing market price by the post-issue 
shares outstanding. Sales are for the last 12 months prior to going public, as reported in the prospectus. The 
mean and median sales are computed for the 6,306 firms for which a sales number is available. All dollar 
values are in dollars of 2003 purchasing power adjusted using the Consumer Price Index.  
 
 
Panel A. Means 
Millions of 2003 Dollars  
Post-Issue 
Valuation 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Number 
of IPOs 
 
 
First-Day 
Return 
 
Number of 
Managing 
Underwriters 
Money 
on the 
Table 
Offer 
Price 
Market 
Price 
 
 
Sales 
1980   70  14.5%  1.4   $5.6   $145   $181   $77 
1981  191   5.8%  1.3   $1.4   $102   $109   $55 
1982   77  11.4%  1.4   $3.3   $111   $126   $41 
1983  442  10.1%  1.5   $3.5   $151   $165   $92 
1984  172   3.6%  1.5   $0.5   $89   $91   $84 
1985  179   6.3%  1.5   $2.0   $188   $194   $202 
1986  378   6.3%  1.5   $2.9   $182   $194   $171 
1987  271   6.0%  1.8   $3.9   $219   $234   $248 
1988   97   5.4%  1.7   $2.0   $306   $315   $300 
1989  105   8.1%  1.6   $3.3   $229   $245   $241 
1990  104  10.8%  1.9   $4.4   $206   $225   $365 
1991  274  12.0%  2.0   $6.6   $211   $236   $237 
1992  385  10.2%  2.0   $5.8   $217   $237   $222 
1993  484  12.8%  2.1   $8.4   $269   $304   $263 
1994  387   9.8%  2.0   $4.5   $179   $193   $204 
1995  434  21.5%  2.3  $12.1   $268   $320   $211 
1996  623  16.7%  2.4  $12.3   $330   $392   $160 
1997  437  14.0%  2.5  $11.3   $287   $334   $181 
1998  268  22.2%  2.9  $21.1   $540   $652   $332 
1999  457  71.7%  3.4  $86.2   $890  $1,519   $368 
2000  346  56.1%  3.7  $82.8   $963  $1,635   $270 
2001   80  13.5% 4.4 $30.9  $2,084  $2,239  $2,130 
2002   67 8.9% 4.7 $17.3  $1,147  $1,239  $1,137 
2003   63  12.2%  4.0  $16.0   $575   $645   $380 
1980-1989 1,982  7.3%  1.5  $2.8    $170  $181  $149 
1990-1998  3,396  14.8%  2.3  $10.0   $281   $325   $222 
1999-2000   803  65.0%  3.6  $84.7   $921  $1,569   $326 
2001-2003   210  11.7%  4.4  $22.1 $1,332 $1,442 $1,289 
Total 6,391  18.7%  2.3  $17.5  $361  $474  $248  Financial Management • Autumn 2004  16 
Table I. Number of IPOs, First Day Returns, Number of Managing Underwriters, 
Amount of Money Left on the Table, Valuation Levels, and Sales by Cohort Year 
(Continued) 
 
Panel B. Medians 
Millions of 2003 Dollars  
Post-Issue 
Valuation 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Number 
of IPOs 
 
 
First-
Day 
Return 
 
Number of 
Managing 
Underwriters 
Money on 
the Table 
Offer 
Price 
Market 
Price 
 
 
Sales 
1980   70       8.0%  1   $0.8   $65   $77   $43 
1981  191   0.0%  1   $0.0   $64   $65   $26 
1982   77   3.7%  1   $0.4   $57   $64   $20 
1983  442   2.6%  1   $0.5   $81   $86   $26 
1984  172   0.0%  1   $0.0   $49   $51   $37 
1985  179   2.5%  1   $0.6   $66   $66   $47 
1986  378   1.3%  1   $0.2   $71   $75   $48 
1987  271   1.4%  2   $0.4   $83   $84   $48 
1988   97   2.5%  2   $0.5  $109  $117   $93 
1989  105   4.3%  2   $1.2  $100  $113   $55 
1990  104   5.4%  2   $1.5  $111  $121   $55 
1991  274   7.5%  2   $2.5  $120  $135   $67 
1992  385   4.2%  2   $1.1  $111  $120   $55 
1993  484   6.3%  2   $1.9  $106  $117   $58 
1994  387   4.5%  2   $1.2   $87   $93   $46 
1995  434  13.3%  2    $4.5 $127  $150   $37 
1996  623  10.0%  2    $3.6 $136  $156   $33 
1997  437   9.4%  2   $3.3  $128  $143   $41 
1998  268   9.0%  3   $3.4  $178  $213   $45 
1999  457  37.5%  3  $29.8 $345  $529   $18 
2000  346  27.4%  3  $23.3 $436  $607   $11 
2001 80  10.0%  4  $10.3  $442  $465  $140 
2002  67   8.0%  4   $8.6  $479  $506  $194 
2003 63    9.8%  4  $10.3  $335  $369  $165 
1980-1989 1,982  1.9%  1  $0.4  $72  $76  $38 
1990-1998 3,396  7.8%  2  $2.4  $122  $134  $46 
1999-2000 803 32.3%  3  $27.1  $387 $563  $15 
2001-2003 210  8.8%  4  $9.7  $394 $459 $164 
Total 6,391  6.3%  2  $1.7  $123  $136  $40 
 
 
IV. Univariate Sorts 
Can the changing characteristics of IPOs, a realignment of incentives, and changing 
issuer objectives explain the increase in underpricing over time? In this section, we first 
provide some evidence based on univariate sorts. Table II reports the mean first-day 
returns on IPOs after several simple sorts for four subperiods: the 1980s, the 1990s, the 
internet bubble, and the post-bubble period. One can see that some of the cross-sectional 
patterns in the 1980s reversed in the 1990s. In the 1990s, larger offers were underpriced 
more than smaller ones, and IPOs with a prestigious lead underwriter were underpriced Loughran & Ritter • Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?  17 
Table II. Average First-day Returns on IPOs Categorized by Proceeds, Assets, Sales, 
Age, Industry, VC-backing, Share Overhang, and Underwriter Prestige 
 
Unit offers, REITs, closed-end funds, banks and S&Ls, ADRs, IPOs with an offer price below $5.00, and 
IPOs not listed on CRSP within six months of the offer date are excluded. Data are from Thomson 
Financial Securities Data and other sources, with corrections by the authors. The sample size is 6,391 
IPOs for 1980-2003. High-prestige underwriters are those with a Carter and Manaster (1990) ranking of 8 
or higher on a 9-point scale. Rankings for 1985-1991 are based upon the Carter et al. (1998) rankings. 
Rankings for 1992-2003 are by the authors. Further descriptions of how age, industry, and underwriter 
prestige are defined are in the appendices. Firms are classified by proceeds on the basis of whether the 
global gross proceeds are higher or lower than the median issue size in the prior calendar year, with no 
adjustment for inflation. Firms with pre-issue assets of less than $40 million (2003 purchasing power) are 
classified as small. Firms with trailing 12 month sales of $40 million or less (2003 purchasing power) are 
classified as low sales firms. Share overhang is the ratio of retained shares to the public float. Low share 
overhang IPOs have an overhang ratio lower than 2.333 (representing a global offer size of 30% or more 
of the post-issue shares outstanding, if all of the shares in the IPO are issued by the firm). The file price 
range is missing for 11 firms. Sales is missing for 85 firms. Age is missing for 120 firms, and assets is 
missing for 223 firms.  
 
 
 1980-1989  1990-1998  1999-2000  2001-2003 
Segmented  by  Return N Return N Return  N  Return  N 
Proceeds                
  Small   7.4%  880  12.1%  1,551   32.7%  232  12.4%  77 
  Large   7.3%  1,102  17.0%  1,845   78.1%  571  11.3%  133 
Assets                
  Small   9.0%  1,095  16.8%  1,519   71.0%  458  12.0%  50 
  Large   4.5%  717  13.1%  1,825   57.2%  344  11.6%  160 
Sales                
  Low   9.2%  1,003  18.3%  1,545   73.0%  560  12.5%  52 
  High   5.2%  944  11.7%  1,805   46.6%  240  11.5%  157 
Age                
  Young (0-7 years old)   9.0%  1,003  17.1%  1,640   75.2%  536  14.6%  72 
  Old (8 years and older)   5.8%  942  12.7%  1,681   45.2%  263  10.1%  134 
Industry                
  Tech and internet-related  10.2%  576  22.2%  1,081   80.6%  585  16.4%  60 
  Non-technology   6.2%  1,406  11.3%  2,315   23.1%  218    9.8%  150 
Segmented by venture capital backing 
  Non VC-backed   7.1%  1,437  13.8%  2,000   38.5%  316    9.4%  125 
  VC-backed   8.0%  545  16.1%  1,397   82.2%  487  15.0%  85 
Segmented by source of shares offered 
  Exclusively sold by firm   7.7%  868  13.8%  1,999   69.4%  681  11.7%  147 
  Including secondary shares   7.1%  1,114  16.1%  1,396   40.4%  122  11.7%  63 
Segmented by share overhang 
  Low   7.8%  885  11.8%  1,846   26.1%  134    7.2%  87 
  High   7.0%  1,097  18.3%  1,550   72.7%  669  14.8%  123 
Segmented by underwriter prestige 
  Low-prestige   9.1%  1,119  12.9%  1,302   35.1%  151  12.2%  45 
  High-prestige   5.1%  863  15.9%  2,094   71.9%  652  11.5%  165 
Segmented by the offer price relative to the file price range 
  Revised up    20.5%  246  32.0%  777  119.0%  362  24.3%  42 
  OP within range   7.8%  1,181  12.3%  1,750    26.8%  296  10.3%  116 
  Revised down   0.5%  544    4.3%  867      7.9%  145    4.5%  52 
All   7.3%  1,982  14.8%  3,396    65.0%  803  11.7%  210 
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more than those without.5 In the 1990s and internet bubble years, IPOs had high returns 
when a relatively small fraction of the firm was sold in the IPO, as measured by the ratio of 
retained shares to issued shares, called share overhang by Bradley and Jordan (2002). But 
this pattern was not present in the 1980s. Several other patterns have increased in magnitude 
over time. Going across each row in Table II, underpricing uniformly increased until the post- 
bubble period. 
In Table II, during the 1980s, tech stock IPOs had an average first-day return of 10.2%. 
This is the highest average first-day return of any category during the 1980s except for the 
set of IPOs whose offer price was revised upward from the file price maximum. If the changing 
characteristics of IPOs explained all the changes in underpricing across time, it would be 
hard to imagine that the average first-day return in the 1990s would have increased to much 
more than 10.2% if the first-day returns were drawn from a stationary distribution. 
Barry (1989), Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) argue that, 
because the dilution effect hurts selling shareholders more than if they retain their shares, 
there will be more severe underpricing of pure primary offerings than of IPOs with secondary 
shares. Table II reports that pure primary offerings were associated with greater underpricing 
during the internet bubble period, a pattern not present in any quantitatively important 
manner in the 1980s, 1990s, or the post-bubble period. We now look at some of the patterns 
in more detail. 
A. Age 
Figure 2 graphs the average first-day return in each subperiod after classifying firms by 
their age at the time of going public. In each subperiod, there is more underpricing of young 
firms than of old firms, although the relation is not strictly monotonic. Our results for the 
1980s are consistent with those reported by Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990). 
 Even more noteworthy is the increased underpricing, holding age constant, as one moves 
from the 1980s to the 1990s to the internet bubble period.6 Thus, Figure 2 shows that the 
increase in underpricing over time does not occur merely because younger firms are going 
public. Instead, the relation between age and first-day returns is nonstationary. 
Figure 3 plots the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the age distribution for the IPOs in each 
cohort year over 1980-2003. Four patterns stand out. First, in the early 1990s, the proportion 
of young firms dropped. This decline is associated with an increase in the number of “reverse 
LBOs,” firms going public again after a leveraged buyout. Second, in 1999, more young firms 
went public. This increase is associated with the internet bubble. Third, after the bubble 
burst, few young firms went public. Fourth, there is no strong secular trend in the age 
distribution of firms going public. With only temporary aberrations, the median age has 
stayed remarkably constant at about 7 years. The median age of an issuing firm was 7 years 
in the 1980s and 8 years in the 1990s, before falling to 5 years during the internet bubble, and 
5The difference in underpricing of 7.4% for small firms and 7.3% for large firms in the 1980s is lower than found 
in other studies because we screen out IPOs with an offer price below $5.00 per share. These low price IPOs had 
an average first-day return of 20.5%, and their inclusion would boost the average return on small IPOs during the 
1980s to 8.8%. Low priced IPOs are historically subject to fraud and have been avoided by institutional investors. 
There has been a decrease in these issues over time partly due to tighter listing requirements on Nasdaq, and partly 
due to greater regulatory pressures on this part of the IPO market. 
6The greater variation of average first-day returns during the internet bubble period is due to two features of the 
data. First, the internet bubble period has a smaller sample size, so each age group has fewer firms in it. Second, 
within each age group, the standard deviation of first-day returns is higher. The post-bubble period patterns are 
also affected by a very small sample size in most age categories. Loughran & Ritter • Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?  19 
Figure 2. Average First-day Returns by Age of Firm at Time of IPO 
 
Average first-day returns on IPOs during 1980-1989 (N = 1,945), 1990-1998 (N = 3,321), 1999-2000 (N 
= 799), and 2001-2003 (N = 206) by age of firm at the time of its IPO. IPOs with trailing 12-month sales 
of over $200 million (2003 purchasing power) that are less than two years old are not included, for these 
are typically spinoffs or reverse LBOs or have the founding dates incorrectly listed as the date of 
reincorporation in Delaware. The age of the firm is defined as the calendar year of the IPO minus the 
calendar year of the founding. 
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then rising dramatically to 12 years during the post-bubble period. 
B. CEO Ownership 
The realignment of incentives hypothesis posits that issuing firm executives will not 
bargain as hard for a higher offer price if the CEO owns less of the firm. Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2003) present regression evidence consistent with this prediction, using the 
percentage of shares owned by the CEO as the measure of ownership. It is not obvious, 
however, that CEO percentage ownership is as important as the market value of these shares 
if we want to measure the managerial benefits of a higher offer price. For a pure primary 
offering, the opportunity cost to a pre-issue shareholder of underpricing is the dollar value 
of money left on the table multiplied by the pre-issue fraction of the firm owned by that 
shareholder. Holding the amount of money left on the table from the sale of primary shares 
constant, the fractional ownership is the correct measure of the opportunity cost to a CEO. 
But as our Table I shows, the amount of money left on the table was not constant during  Financial Management • Autumn 2004  20 
Figure 3. 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th Percentiles of Firm Age at Time of Going Public by 
Year of IPO 
 
Each year, companies going public are ranked by firm age. The 25
th, 50
th (median), and 75
th percentiles 
of this age distribution are then plotted. For example, in 1980, 25% of IPOs were 2 years old or younger, 
50% were 6 years old or younger, and 75% were 11 years old or younger. For each subperiod, the 25
th, 
50
th, and 75
th percentiles of the age distribution are 3, 7, and 16 years old (the 1980s); 4, 8, and 16 years 
old (the 1990s); 3, 5, and 9 years old (the internet bubble); and 6, 12, and 26 years old (the post-bubble 
period). The 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th percentiles of the age distribution at the time of going public for the entire 
sample of 6,271 IPOs are 4, 7, and 15 years old. 
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1996-2000. 
To be explicit, the dollar value of the opportunity cost of underpricing to a CEO, if the 
offering is entirely primary, is: 
                  (2) 
where Nceo is the number of shares owned by the CEO, No is the pre-issue number of shares 
outstanding, Nn is the number of newly issued (primary) shares, P is the first closing market 
price, and OP is the offer price per share. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) emphasize that the 
CEO ownership fraction Nceo/No was lower during the bubble period than in previous years. 
But it is also the case that Nn was much higher, while the distribution of nominal offer prices 
did not change much. 
Table III tabulates the median pre-issue CEO percentage ownership reported by Ljungqvist 
and Wilhelm (2003) for 1996-2000 and an estimate of the pre-issue number of shares owned Loughran & Ritter • Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?  21 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Number 
of IPOs 
Median Pre-Issue 
Number of        
CEO Shares 
 
Median 
Offer Price 
Median CEO 
Pre-Issue 
Dollar Value, 
Millions 
Median Pre-Issue 
% CEO     
Ownership 
1996  623     723,591  $12.00    $8.68 m  10.4% 
1997  437     880,401  $11.75  $10.34 m  12.8% 
1998 268  1,188,677  $12.50  $14.86  m  11.8% 
1999  457  1,394,336  $14.00  $19.52 m    8.0% 
2000  346  1,554,172  $14.00  $21.76 m     5.3% 
 
by the CEO for the median company going public in a year, computed as the product of the 
median CEO fractional ownership times the median pre-issue shares outstanding. We also 
report the median offer price in each year and an approximation of the median dollar value of 
shares owned by CEOs, valued at the offer price.7 
Inspection of Table III shows that, while CEO percentage ownership decreased during 
1996-2000, the number of shares owned more than doubled because of the number of shares 
outstanding quadrupled. This dramatic increase in pre-issue shares outstanding is attributable 
to the substantial increase in valuations along with a relatively constant offer price. Thus, 
the median CEO’s market value of equity rose, even though the fractional holdings fell. If 
one were to focus on the market value of the shares owned by the CEO when the firm went 
public, the realignment of incentives hypothesis predicts a decrease in underpricing during 
the bubble period due to the incentive effect. Wealth effects associated with the higher 
market value of the shares might dominate substitution effects, however, making predictions 
hazardous, as Ljungqvist and Wilhelm acknowledge. In any case, the substantial increase 
during 1996-2000 in CEO dollar holdings is in sharp contrast to the decline in CEO holdings 
when ownership is measured as a percentage of shares outstanding. 
C. Prestigious Underwriters 
In general, underwriters with a Carter and Manaster rank of 8.0 to 9.0 (on a scale of 0 to 9) 
are considered to be prestigious national underwriters. Those with a rank of 5.0 to 7.9 are 
considered to be quality regional or niche underwriters. Underwriters with a rank of 0 to 4.9 
7Alexander Ljungqvist has computed the value of the median CEO’s pre-issue market value of equity, using the 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm sample, which is virtually identical to ours for the 1996-2000 period. His numbers for 
the median market value each year show the same trend that we report in Table III, where we multiply the product 
of several medians. Ljungqvist’s pre-issue market value of equity for the median CEO increases from $6.76 
million in 1996 to $20.64 million in 1999 before declining to $16.86 million in 2000, while our Table III medians 
increase from $8.68 million in 1996 to $21.76 million in 2000. 
Table III. Pre-Issue CEO Ownership in Dollar Values and Percentage, 1996-2000 
The median pre-issue number of CEO shares is computed as the product of the median pre-issue number 
of shares outstanding and the median pre-issue % CEO ownership. This should be viewed as an approxi-
mation of the actual median pre-issue number of CEO shares. The median pre-issue % CEO ownership 
is from Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003, Table III). The median CEO pre-issue dollar value is computed 
as the product of the prior two columns, and is also an approximation of the actual median. Neither the 
median offer price nor the median market value (median pre-issue number of CEO shares times the 
median offer price) is adjusted for price level changes (inflation). Inflation averaged less than 3% per 
year during this period.  Financial Management • Autumn 2004  22 
are generally associated with penny stocks; many with ranks of 3.0 or lower have been 
charged by the SEC with market manipulation. In Table IV, we categorize IPOs on the basis of 
lead underwriter prestige. Inspection of the sample sizes shows that prestigious lead 
underwriters increased their market share from under 50% in the 1980s to over 60% in the 
1990s, and then to about 80% during the internet and post-bubble periods.8 
Beatty and Welch (1996), Cooney, Singh, Carter, and Dark (2001), and others have 
documented that a negative relation between underwriter prestige and underpricing in the 
1980s reversed itself in the 1990s, although the authors offer no explanation for the reversal. 
Our Table IV findings confirm this reversal. To rationalize the pattern of the 1980s that 
prestigious underwriters are associated with less underpricing, Carter and Manaster (1990) 
and Carter et al. (1998) argue that IPOs taken public by prestigious underwriters benefit from 
superior certification. Because of the greater reputation capital that is committed, investors 
do not demand as large a discount on these offers. The higher underpricing associated with 
prestigious underwriters in the 1990s and the internet bubble period is inconsistent with the 
joint hypothesis that underwriters are attempting to maximize issuer proceeds and that 
certification is an important determinant of the required amount of money left on the table. 
Instead, it is consistent with the changing issuer objective function hypothesis. 
If issuers became more willing to hire underwriters with a history of underpricing after the 
1980s, this could occur either because of a shift in which underwriters were hired, or a shift 
in the behavior of the underwriters. That is, underwriters, especially those with influential 
analysts and a willingness to allocate hot IPOs to the personal brokerage accounts of issuing 
firm decision-makers, could have changed their pricing policies in order to leave more money 
on the table. The evidence suggests that most of the shifts occurred via changes in the 
behavior of individual underwriters, rather than shifting market shares. For example, for IPOs 
with Goldman Sachs as the bookrunner, the average underpricing was 5.0% in the 1980s, 
23.8% in the 1990s, 99.8% during the bubble, and 11.0% during the post-bubble period. 
Table IV shows that over time, especially in the internet bubble period, prestigious 
underwriters relaxed their underwriting standards and took public an increasing number of 
very young and unprofitable companies. The median sales of firms taken public by prestigious 
underwriters dropped from $80 million in the 1980s to just $17 million during the internet 
bubble period. 
Tables II and IV also report changes over time in the fraction of IPOs with upward revisions 
of the offer price relative to the file price range. Table II reports that, in the 1980s, it was twice 
as likely to see a downward revision as an upward revision, and in the bubble period, the 
proportion of upward revisions was much higher. This cannot be accounted for by differences 
in returns on the Nasdaq Composite in the three weeks prior to issuing. In the first three 
subperiods, the average three-week return immediately prior to issuing was about 1%, 
although in the post-bubble period it was only 0.54%. 
Our analyst lust hypothesis can explain the changes over time that are documented in 
Table IV. In the 1980s, investment bankers competed for IPO underwriting mandates more on 
the basis of implied valuations and less on the basis of analyst coverage (because α1 of 
Equation (1) was higher in the 1980s). If an underwriter indicated it would price a firm higher 
than the competition, it was likely to be chosen. But in winning the mandate, the underwriter 
implicitly committed to a higher file price range, leaving less room to avoid a downward 
revision if market conditions weakened. Investment bankers tell us that managing “issuer 
8Since in all subperiods the biggest deals are more commonly managed by prestigious underwriters, if market share 
is computed using gross proceeds rather than the number of IPOs, the market share of prestigious underwriters 
would be uniformly higher. Loughran & Ritter • Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?  23 
Table IV. Mean and Median First-day Returns, Median Age, Sales, EPS, and Share 
Overhang, and Industry Representation Categorized by Underwriter Prestige 
 
Unit offers, REITs, closed-end funds, banks and S&Ls, ADRs, and IPOs not listed on CRSP within six months 
of the offer date are excluded. Data are from Thomson Financial Securities Data, Dealogic, and other sources. 
High-prestige underwriters are those with a Carter and Manaster (1990) ranking of 8 or higher on a 9-point 
scale. Rankings for 1984 and later are based upon the Carter et al. (1998) rankings and updates by the authors 
of this paper. See Appendix C for details. Sales are measured in millions of dollars of year 2003 purchasing 
power, using the Consumer Price Index. Share overhang is the ratio of retained shares to the public float. 
Percentage tech is the percentage of IPOs that are classified as technology or internet-related, as defined in 
Appendix D. The sample size is 6,391 IPOs over 1980-2003, except for age, sales, EPS, and offer price 
revision, where some observations are lost due to missing information. 
 
 1980-1989  1990-1998  1999-2000  2001-2003 
  Return  N  Return  N  Return  N  Return     N 
Mean first-day returns         
  Low prestige  9.1%  1,119    12.9%    1,302 35.1% 151 12.2%      45 
  High prestige  5.1%     863  15.9%  2,094  71.9%  652  11.5%  165 
Median first-day returns   
  Low prestige  2.5%  1,119  7.1%  1,302  12.2%  151  11.1%    45 
  High prestige  1.2%     863  8.7%  2,094  37.5%  652    8.3%  165 
Median  Age               
  Low prestige  6 years  1,115  7 years    1,298  5 years  151  9 years    45 
  High prestige  9 years     849  8 years    2,050  5 years  649  14 years  162 
Median trailing sales (millions)         
  Low prestige  $21.5  1,086  $25.8  1,268    $9.1  150   $44.1    45 
  High Prestige  $80.2     861  $71.7  2,082  $17.3  650  $269.4  164 
Median trailing 12-month EPS         
  Low prestige  $0.38  1,099  $0.25  1,302  -$0.58  151  -$0.25    45 
  High prestige  $0.59    855  $0.27  2,094  -$1.18  652   $0.02  165 
Median share overhang         
  Low prestige  2.28  1,119  1.96  1,302    2.91  151   2.00    45 
  High prestige  2.82     863  2.44  2,094    4.31  652   2.97  165 
Percentage with an offer price above the maximum of the file price range 
  Low prestige    9%  1,110   11%  1,302   28%  151   9%    45 
  High prestige   17%     861   30%  2,094   49%  652  23%  165 
Percentage tech and internet-related         
  Low prestige  30.6%  1,119  28.3%  1,302  68.9%  151  33.3%    45 
  High prestige  27.1%     863  34.0%  2,094  72.8%  652  27.3%  165 
All    7.3% 1,982 14.8% 3,396 65.0% 803 11.7%  210 
 
expectations” is part of their job. In the 1990s, underwriters with star analysts could win a 
mandate without committing to a high valuation that issuers would anchor their expectations 
on. In the bubble period, this was taken to an extreme; many issuers accepted a low file price 
range because they were more focused on choosing an underwriter with an influential analyst 
or with underpriced IPOs to allocate to an executive’s personal brokerage account than on 
getting a high valuation. 
The academic literature generally views the midpoint of the file price range as an unbiased 
estimate of the offer price, and revisions in the offer price as reflecting unanticipated strong 
or weak demand. Houston, James, and Karceski (2004) report that during the bubble period, 
the file price range was low-balled relative to the value implied by comparable firm multiples.  Financial Management • Autumn 2004  24 
During the internet bubble, Donaldson Lufkin Jenrette and Goldman Sachs, among others, 
low-balled the file price range on some IPOs in what DLJ refers to as a “walkup” strategy in 
its “pitchbook” for the August 2000 Viasource IPO. 
In the early 1980s, many underwriters were thinly capitalized firms where risk-sharing was 
important. On a $50 million deal with a 7% gross spread, the underwriters shared $3.5 million 
in fees. The lead underwriter might get 20% of this, or $0.7 million. As underwriters grew 
larger, the lead manager was able to keep 60% of the fees, or $2.1 million. Furthermore, with 
more money left on the table, the lead underwriter could get quid pro quos that might be 
worth another $2.1 million. So it became a lot more lucrative to be the lead underwriter. To get 
this business, it was important to have an analyst who would be bullish. Issuers were willing 
to pay higher indirect fees due to both the analyst lust hypothesis and the spinning 
hypothesis. The time series evidence is consistent with this story, but what about cross- 
sectional implications? 
V. Multiple Regression Results 
One explanation for the cross-sectional pattern between age and first-day returns is that 
younger firms are riskier firms, and investors need to be compensated for this risk. The 
negative relationship between sales and first-day returns reported in Table II also can be 
interpreted as demonstrating a relation between the risk of an IPO and underpricing. The 
univariate sorts in Tables II and IV, however, are not independent. Tech firms are much more 
likely to be young firms, for instance. Thus, to examine marginal effects, we report multiple 
regression results with first-day return as the dependent variable. Our explanatory variables 
are chosen on the basis either of their association with first-day returns in our univariate 
sorts, or to test the changing risk composition, realignment of incentives, and changing 
issuer objective function hypotheses. 
A. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results 
In the first and second rows of Table V, we use a total of 15 explanatory variables: a Carter- 
Manaster top-tier underwriter dummy (set equal to one if the lead underwriter has a rank of 
8 or more, and zero otherwise), the logarithm of assets, a tech stock dummy, an internet stock 
dummy, the logarithm of (1 + age), share overhang (the ratio of retained shares to issued 
shares), a VC dummy, a pure primary offering dummy, the logarithm of sales, a dummy variable 
for IPOs in 1990-1998, a dummy variable for IPOs in 1999-2000, a dummy variable for IPOs in 
2001-2003, and interaction terms between the Carter-Manaster top-tier underwriter dummy 
and the time period dummy variables. Both assets and sales are measured in millions of 
dollars of 2003 purchasing power. The regression is: 
First-Day Returni = a0 + a1Top-Tier Underwriter Dummyi + a2ln(Assets)i + a3Tech Dummyi 
 + a4Internet Dummyi +a5ln(1 + Age)i + a6Overhang i + a7VC Dummyi 
+ a8Pure Primary Dummyi + a9ln(Sales)i + a10Top-Tier Dummy·Nineties Dummyi 
 + a11Top-Tier Dummy·Bubble Dummyi + a12 Top-Tier Dummy·Post Dummyi 
 + a13Nineties Dummyi + a14Bubble Dummyi + a15Post Dummyi + ei 
The variables ln(assets), tech stock dummy, internet dummy, ln(1 + age), and ln(sales) measure 
changing risk composition. The pure primary dummy is a measure of the realignment of incentives, Loughran & Ritter • Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?  25 
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with a predicted positive coefficient. The changing issuer objective function hypothesis is tested 
by the change over time in the coefficients on the top-tier underwriter dummy. Our hypothesis is 
that, ceteris paribus, IPOs underwritten by top-tier underwriters were underpriced more in the 
1990s and, especially, in the bubble period because of spinning and because they had more 
highly ranked analysts. We use a top-tier Carter-Manaster ranking as a proxy for all-star analyst 
presence and the ability and willingness to spin. It should be noted that the vast majority of 
Institutional Investor all-star analysts are employed by top-tier underwriters, which we define as 
investment bankers with a Carter-Manaster rank of 8 or higher. 
Several variables capture the predictions of multiple hypotheses. For example, all three 
hypotheses are consistent with a positive coefficient on overhang, because the opportunity 
cost of underpricing is lower, the lower is the fraction of the firm sold (and thus the greater 
the overhang), and small proportionate offerings are associated with high valuations. 
The slope coefficients in the row 1 regression are generally consistent with the univariate 
results reported earlier, although the lack of significance for the VC dummy and ln(sales) 
suggests that correlations between variables drive some of the univariate patterns. The 
negative coefficients on ln(assets) and ln(1 + age), and the positive coefficients on the tech 
and internet dummies, are consistent with the changing risk composition hypothesis, given 
that the bubble period saw a higher proportion of IPOs by young tech and internet firms 
than other periods. The negative and insignificant coefficient on the pure primary dummy is 
not consistent with the realignment of incentives hypothesis. 
Recall that the average first-day return increased from 7.3% in the 1980s to 14.8% in the 
1990s, 65.0% during the internet bubble, and 11.7% in the post-bubble period. We seek to 
explain these increases: 7.5 percentage points from the 1980s to the 1990s, 57.7 percentage 
points from the 1980s to the internet bubble, and 4.4 percentage points from the 1980s to the 
post-bubble period. In Table V, the row 1 coefficient on the nineties dummy of 8.86, or 8.86%, 
suggests that none of the increase in underpricing from the 1980s to the 1990s has been 
explained. The coefficient on the bubble dummy variable of 33.49 implies that only some of 
the 57.7% difference in underpricing between the 1980s and the internet bubble period is 
accounted for. And the coefficient of 5.39 on the post-bubble dummy variable suggests that 
the variables are not adequate to explain the difference in underpricing between the 1980s 
and the post-bubble period as well. 
In row 2, we add three explanatory variables allowing a shift in the top-tier underwriter 
dummy coefficient over time. Specifically, we add three interaction terms by multiplying the 
top-tier underwriter dummy by the time period dummies. As the changing issuer objective 
function hypothesis would predict, all three of these interaction variables have positive 
coefficients in row 2, and the shifts in the 1990s and bubble periods are statistically significant. 
In row 2, the coefficient on the nineties dummy of 6.82 (6.8%) indicates that we are still 
unable to explain the unconditional difference in underpricing between the 1980s and 1990s 
of 7.5%. Most importantly, however, the coefficient on the bubble dummy falls to a statistically 
insignificant 6.66 (6.7%). Since the unconditional difference in underpricing between the 
1980s and the bubble period is 57.7%, the row 2 regression is able to account for the vast 
majority of the extra underpricing associated with the bubble period. The same is true for the 
post-bubble dummy, where the coefficient of 3.34 (3.3%) is statistically indistinguishable 
from both zero and the unconditional difference in underpricing of 4.4%. Hence, the shift in 
the top-tier underwriter variable can explain all of the increase in first-day returns between 
the 1980s and the bubble and post-bubble time periods. 
Thus, the coefficients on the time period dummies in row 1 suggest that neither the 
changing risk composition hypothesis nor the realignment of incentives hypothesis is able Loughran & Ritter • Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?  27 
to explain much of the unconditional changes in underpricing over time. On the other hand, 
when we introduce variables suggested by the changing issuer objective function hypothesis 
in row 2, the bubble period dummy drops to a statistically insignificant 6.66%, although the 
inability to explain the higher underpricing in the 1990s remains. 
Rows 3-6 present subperiod results. The top-tier underwriter dummy coefficient is reliably 
negative in the 1980s, positive in the 1990s, very positive in the bubble period, and insignificant 
in the post-bubble period. In the bubble period, the coefficient on the top-tier underwriter 
dummy is 21.22. This implies that IPOs with a top-tier lead underwriter had 21.2% higher first- 
day returns than IPOs with less prestigious bankers, after adjusting for other factors. 
This increase in underpricing associated with prestigious underwriters in the 1990s and 
the bubble period is a test of the changing issuer objective function hypothesis. Also 
consistent with this hypothesis is the increasing market share of top-tier underwriters reported 
in Tables II and IV. As we have argued, issuer decision-makers were willing to pay for their 
services by leaving money on the table because of the side payments and the positive 
analyst coverage that they or their companies received. 
Inspection of the subperiod results in rows 3-6 of Table V shows that the parameter 
estimates on all of the explanatory variables except ln(1 + age) have changed over time. This 
nonstationarity suggests that increased underpricing over time is not attributable entirely to 
an increase in the fraction of IPOs by riskier companies or a realignment of incentives, 
unless, for example, an omitted variable bias has different effects in different subperiods. 
B. Instrumental Variable Regression Results 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2004), and others argue that 
the prestige of the lead underwriter is endogenous in regressions with underpricing as the 
dependent variable. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) deal with this by running two-stage least 
squares regressions for underpricing, where rather than using the Carter-Manaster underwriter 
prestige rank, they use the predicted rank from a first-stage OLS regression. In Table VI, we 
report underpricing regression results after controlling for the endogeneity of underwriter 
choice by using an instrument for the Carter-Manaster underwriter rank. Our qualitative 
conclusions are not substantially altered. 
In Panel A of Table VI, the first-stage OLS regression for underwriter rank has as explanatory 
variables ln(assets), a tech dummy, an internet dummy, ln(1 + age), share overhang, a VC 
dummy, a pure primary dummy variable, ln(sales), and age/assets.9 In rows 1 and 2 of our 
Table V regressions, the pure primary dummy, the VC dummy, and ln(sales) were weakly 
related at best to first-day returns. In Panel A of Table VI, these three variables are strongly 
related to underwriter rank, except for the post-bubble subperiod, where a small sample size 
limits the statistical significance of all variables. 
In Panel B of Table VI, we report regression results with underpricing as the dependent 
variable. In row 6, we report OLS regression coefficients. In row 7, we report regression 
coefficients from the second-stage regression using the predicted value of underwriter rank 
to construct the top-tier underwriter dummy instrument. That is, if the predicted Carter- 
Manaster rank is 8 or higher, the predicted value of the top-tier underwriter dummy is one, 
and zero otherwise. 
Both rows 6 and 7 use the entire 24-year sample period, and a comparison of the two rows 
shows that controlling for the endogeneity of underwriter choice does not substantially alter 
the conclusions drawn from Table V. Both the 1990s and the post-bubble dummy variables 
9For IPOs with an age-to-assets ratio higher than one, we set the ratio value at one.  Financial Management • Autumn 2004  28 
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have approximately the same coefficient values in rows 6 and 7, but there is a difference 
between the rows in terms of the bubble dummy coefficient. Row 6 (OLS) reports an insignificant 
coefficient of 5.99 while the row 7 second-stage regression has a coefficient of 18.51. This is 
still much closer to zero than the 57.7% unconditional difference in underpricing, however. 
Rows 8-11 report subperiod results for the instrumented regressions, which are analogous 
to the OLS regressions in rows 3-6 of Table V. Controlling for the endogeneity of underwriter 
choice has no impact on our qualitative conclusions, except that for the 1980s the coefficient 
on the top-tier underwriter dummy changes from negative to insignificantly positive. 
VI. Alternative Explanations for the Underpricing of Internet Stocks 
Many alternative explanations have been advanced for the severe underpricing of IPOs 
during the internet bubble.10 One view is that many issuers were more concerned with the 
market price at lockup expiration than with what the offer price was. Developing this idea, 
Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) argue that severe underpricing generates 
“information momentum,” resulting in a higher market price at the end of the lockup period 
when insiders typically sell some of their shares. While this may be true, it is not clear that 
the benefits to the issuing firm exceed the opportunity cost associated with the increased 
dilution from underpricing the IPO. Nevertheless, we are comfortable with the notion that 
during the internet bubble issuers placed less weight on IPO proceeds and more weight on 
the proceeds from future insider sales and follow-on offerings than they did in prior periods. 
This, after all, is part of the analyst lust hypothesis. 
During the internet bubble, there were widespread concerns about the valuation of internet 
stocks. One explanation for the severe underpricing of internet IPOs is that underwriters 
were unwilling to price these offerings at the level that the market was willing to pay out of 
concern about lawsuits and damage to reputation if and when the stocks eventually dropped 
in price. The argument is that unsophisticated day traders and others were bidding up the 
price to unjustified levels, and the underwriters were unwilling to price the IPOs at the 
market price determined by these “noise traders.” 
In untabulated results, we do not find a negative relation between first-day returns and 
subsequent performance in either the 1980s or the 1990s, but we do find reversals during the 
internet bubble.11 For example, of the 19 IPOs with a first-day return of more than 300% 
during the internet bubble, the average buy-and-hold return from the first closing price until 
the end of December 2002 is –95.0%.12 Measured from the offer price, the average return 
through December 2002 (or the delisting date, if earlier) is –73.7% for these 19 IPOs, compared 
to –43.5% for the other bubble period IPOs. This evidence is consistent with the idea that 
10DuCharme, Rajgopal, and Sefcik (2001), Schultz and Zaman (2001), and Ofek and Richardson (2003), among 
others, examine various hypotheses for the high underpricing of US internet stocks. Arosio, Giudici, and Paleari 
(2001) present evidence for the severe underpricing of European internet stocks. 
11Logue, Rogalski, Seward, and Foster-Johnson (2002) for IPOs in 1988-1995 and Houge, Loughran, Suchanek, 
and Yan (2001) for IPOs in 1993-1996 find a slight negative relation between first-day returns and subsequent 
three-year stock performance. Lowry (2003) finds no relation for IPOs in 1973-1996, and Loughran and Ritter 
(2002) find no relation for IPOs in 1990-1998. 
12The only one of these 19 IPOs that did not decline by more than 90% from the first-day close through 
December 2002 is Cobalt Networks, which was acquired in December 2000 after falling by 65.1%. Measured from 
the first closing price to 180 calendar days later, the average return was –46.8%. The bookrunners (with partial 
credit given for joint bookrunners) on these 19 IPOs were SG Cowen for 1, CSFB for 3, Deutsche Bank for 1.5, 
Donaldson Lufkin Jenrette for 0.5, Goldman Sachs for 1.5, Merrill Lynch for 2, Morgan Stanley for 8.5, and 
Robertson Stephens for 1. Loughran & Ritter • Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?  31 
overoptimistic investor sentiment temporarily inflated the market prices on these IPOs. 
We are skeptical of this explanation for severe underpricing, however, for if underwriters 
were concerned that the market prices on internet stocks were too high, presumably their 
analyst recommendations after the end of the quiet period would have been bearish. Bradley, 
Jordan, and Ritter (2003), Cliff and Denis (2004), and Houston, James, and Karceski (2004) 
find this is in fact not the case. 
The poor subsequent performance of IPOs with high first-day returns in the bubble period 
is also consistent with a less innocuous explanation, however. As is typical in the academic 
IPO literature, we have taken the first closing market price as exogenous. Yet Smith and 
Pulliam (2002) state that: 
[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission is examining whether some securities firms 
coerced investors who got hot IPO shares into placing orders for the same stocks at 
higher prices on the first day of trading, as a condition of getting the IPOs. That 
practice, known as “laddering,” contributed to the huge one-day run-ups in many IPOs 
during the tech-stock mania. The SEC’s laddering probe has focused on firms including 
Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, Robertson Stephens and J.P Morgan Chase. 
On October 1, 2003, J.P. Morgan Chase settled with the SEC, paying a $25 million fine. 
Investors would be willing to buy these additional shares in the aftermarket if the sum of 
the profits from the IPO allocation they received and the aftermarket purchases were positive 
(calculated using the weighted average purchase price). In many cases, the sales would 
occur on the day the quiet period ends, which is when the underwriters’ analysts typically 
initiate coverage, almost always with “buy” ratings. Thus, tainted analyst recommendations, 
which unsuspecting individual investors paid attention to, allow an exit at an inflated price. 
Laddering would contribute to a negative correlation between first-day returns and long- 
run returns because the extra buying pressure on the first day from these purchase orders 
would create subsequent selling pressure when these shares were sold. Unless the market 
price is unaffected by buying and selling pressure, there will be price impacts. The evidence 
of stock price effects for analyst initiations at the end of the quiet period (Bradley et al., 2003 
and Ofek and Richardson, 2003), and for selling pressure at the end of the lockup period 
(Bradley, Jordan, Roten, and Yi, 2001; Brav and Gompers, 2003; and Field and Hanka, 2001) 
suggests that such effects are present for IPOs. 
VII. Conclusions 
Why has underpricing changed over time? We explore three non-mutually exclusive 
explanations: changing risk composition, a realignment of incentives, and a changing issuer 
objective function. 
A small part of the increase in underpricing can be attributed to the changing risk 
composition of the universe of firms going public. The physical riskiness of firms going 
public, as measured, for example, by age or assets, did not change very much between the 
1980s and the 1990s, although the bubble period saw a high proportion of very young firms 
go public, and the post-bubble period saw a high proportion of older firms. 
The realignment of incentives hypothesis argues that managerial incentives to reduce 
underpricing have decreased over time because of, among other reasons, reduced CEO 
ownership and a higher fraction of IPOs with no secondary shares. When we look at the  Financial Management • Autumn 2004  32 
whole sample period, however, there are only weak cross-sectional relations between 
underpricing and both the fraction of the firm sold and a dummy variable for a pure primary 
offering. Furthermore, CEO ownership, as measured by the dollar value of holdings at the 
offer price, was twice as high during the bubble period as during the 1996-1998 period. This 
measure of CEO incentives suggests that underpricing should have decreased during the 
bubble period. 
The changing issuer objective function hypothesis posits two reasons for why issuers 
became more complacent about underpricing in the 1990s and internet bubble period. First, 
the analyst lust hypothesis states that analyst coverage became a more important factor for 
issuers choosing a lead underwriter, due to higher valuations than in the 1980s. Since 
underwriters do not charge explicit fees for providing analyst coverage, issuers pay through 
the indirect cost of underpricing. Second, the spinning hypothesis argues that venture 
capitalists and the executives of issuing firms were co-opted through the allocation of hot 
IPOs to their personal brokerage accounts. This gave these decision-makers an incentive to 
choose a lead underwriter with a reputation for leaving money on the table in IPOs. Although 
the excessive dilution that results from underpricing their own IPO lowers their wealth, they 
gain on personal account when other hot IPOs are allocated to them. Since the profits from 
these other IPOs are imperfectly correlated with their undiversified paper wealth in their own 
company, the decision-makers are willing to accept excessive underpricing when their own 
firm goes public. 
Multiple regressions with underpricing as the dependent variable yield evidence that 
supports the changing issuer objective function hypothesis. Specifically, top-tier underwriters 
are associated with more underpricing in the 1990s, and especially in the bubble period. This 
is the result in both OLS and two-stage procedures that control for the endogenous choice 
of the lead underwriter. This is consistent with issuers choosing top-tier underwriters who 
have both influential analysts and, until spinning was prohibited, many other hot IPOs to 
allocate to important decision-makers. Furthermore, there is strong corroborating evidence 
in recent academic studies examining the relation between Institutional Investor all-star 
analysts and both IPO underpricing and changes in underwriter market share, and in regulatory 
settlements regarding spinning. We know of no evidence that is inconsistent with the testable 
implications of the spinning and analyst lust hypotheses. 
We also document patterns in the US IPO market. The universe of companies going public 
in the US has changed over time. For example, we document that there has been a pronounced 
shift towards technology stocks and firms with negative earnings. How firms are brought 
public has changed over time, too. The market share of the prestigious national underwriters 
has increased, and regional investment banking firms are increasingly shut out of lead 
underwriter positions. 
The reasons that IPOs are underpriced vary, depending on the environment. In the 1980s, it 
is conceivable that the winner’s curse problem and dynamic information acquisition were the 
main explanations for underpricing that averaged 7% in the US. During the internet bubble, we 
think that these were not the main reasons for underpricing. Instead, analyst coverage and 
side payments to CEOs and venture capitalists became of significant importance.  
Appendix A. Founding Dates 
The founding date is generally defined as the date of incorporation. We try to find the date 
of original incorporation, rather than a later date if the firm has reincorporated in Delaware or Loughran & Ritter • Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?  33 
changed its name. Founding dates for 1980-1984 generally come from inspection of the 
prospectus. For 1985-1995, most of the founding dates were provided by Laura Field. For 1985- 
1987, Moody’s is the main source of data. For 1988-1992, the prospectus is the main source. For 
1993-1995, Disclosure and S&P Corporate Descriptions are the main sources. For 1993, some of 
the founding dates have come from Renaissance Capital. For 1996-2003, founding dates come 
from a variety of sources: Securities Data Co., Moody’s, Dun & Bradstreet’s Million Dollar 
Directory, and inspection of the prospectuses on Edgar, and were collected primarily by Laura 
Field (Field and Karpoff, 2002) and Li-Anne Woo. Some founding dates for 1999-2003 are from 
Thomson Financial’s The IPO Reporter, an industry newsletter. According to Laura Field, for 
1988-1992, founding dates are earlier than the date of the most recent incorporation for 48% of 
the firms. An example of this is from the April 2000 prospectus of Krispy Kreme doughnuts. 
The firm going public was incorporated in 1999, but the predecessor corporation was 
incorporated in 1982. Elsewhere in the prospectus one finds the statement that their first 
doughnut shop was opened in 1937. We use 1937 as the founding date. 
For 1996-2000, we have used some of the founding dates that Alexander Ljungqvist and 
William Wilhelm have tabulated for their paper (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003). They inspected 
prospectuses and made judgments on many spinoffs. 
Firms with inflation-adjusted (2003 purchasing power) sales in the last 12 months prior to 
going public of $200 million or more and younger than 2 years are frequently “reverse LBOs” 
or divisional spinoffs. For spinoffs, the founding date of the division is used, when possible. 
This may be the founding date of the parent corporation. For example, Lucent Technologies 
(a 1996 IPO) is the former Bell Labs division of AT&T. Its founding date is given as the 
founding date of Bell Labs. In general, “roll-ups” are given a founding date corresponding 
to the founding date of the parent firm (frequently a year before the IPO). 
Age is defined as the calendar year of offering minus the calendar year of founding. Thus, 
a 2-year old firm may be anywhere from 13 months old to 35 months old. 
Because some years (1980-1984, 1988-1993, and 2000-2003) have founding dates that are 
primarily from the prospectus, rather than dates of incorporation from Moody’s, etc., some 
of the variation over time may be due to different data sources. 
Appendix B. Post-Issue Shares Outstanding and Dual-class Shares 
Of the 6,391 IPOs in our sample, 433 have multiple classes of shares outstanding after the 
IPO. Most of these are firms whose IPO is composed of Class A shares. Class B shares with 
superior voting rights are owned by pre-issue shareholders, and are not publicly traded. 
These firms present a problem for computing the market capitalization. CRSP reports shares 
outstanding only for share classes that are publicly traded on Nasdaq, the Amex, or the 
NYSE. Thus, using the CRSP-reported shares outstanding to compute the market capitalization 
captures only part of the market value. To take an extreme example, the United Parcel Services 
IPO of November 9, 1999 issued 109 million shares of Class A stock, but over 1 billion shares 
of Class B stock also existed. Using only the Class A shares outstanding would underestimate 
the market value by 91%. The December 9, 1998 IPO of Infinity Broadcasting is another 
example. 140 million Class A shares were issued. CRSP reports this as the number of shares 
outstanding. But there were also 700 million Class B shares outstanding, giving a market cap 
six times as high for all the shares. In all our calculations of market capitalization, we assume 
that non-traded shares have the same price per share as the publicly traded class. 
Thomson Financial Securities Data has many errors in reporting the number of post-issue  Financial Management • Autumn 2004  34 
shares outstanding, although the firm attempts to capture all classes. For single-class IPOs, 
CRSP is much more reliable. For dual-class IPOs, Thomson Financial is more reliable. 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), in their analysis of IPOs from 1996-2000, also report substantial 
error rates in Thomson Financial’s data on, e.g., post-issue shares outstanding, EPS, venture 
capital backing, and founding dates. 
If we use just the CRSP-reported shares outstanding, the median market cap figure that we 
calculate is 4% lower than the Table I, Panel B numbers reported. The mean market cap using 
CRSP data is 17% lower than the numbers reported in Table I, Panel A. 
Scott Smart and Chad Zutter supplied us with a list of 258 dual-class IPOs for 1990-1998, 
along with the post-issue shares outstanding. CRSP does not identify all the IPOs that 
involve dual-class shares that Smart and Zutter (2003) identify. The post-issue shares 
outstanding number that Smart and Zutter have recorded is the same as the Thomson Financial 
number only a little over 50% of the time. For discrepancies where we could check the 
prospectus using EDGAR (beginning in 1996), we found that Smart and Zutter were correct 
over 90% of the time. For dual-class IPOs where we could not verify the number, we use the 
Smart and Zutter number as the first choice and the maximum of the Thomson Financial and 
the CRSP number as the second choice. We use Dealogic’s number if we cannot inspect the 
prospectus on EDGAR. 
Appendix C. Underwriter Rank for IPOs over 1992-2003 
For underwriter prestige rankings, we start with the Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter 
et al. (1998) rankings. When a firm goes public, the underwriting section of the prospectus 
lists all the investment banking firms that are part of the underwriting syndicate, along with 
the number of shares that each underwrites. Lead underwriters are listed first, followed by 
co-managing underwriters, and then other syndicate members. More prestigious underwriters 
are listed first in the non-managing underwriting section, in brackets, with underwriters in 
higher brackets underwriting more shares. If an underwriter always appears in the highest 
bracket among non-managing underwriters, it is assigned the top ranking of 9 on a 0-9 scale. 
For underwriters in the 1992-2003 period, we assign a ranking as follows. The May 1999 
Goldman Sachs prospectus lists over 120 underwriters, with numerous brackets. Managing 
and co-managing underwriters are assigned a ranking of 9; other underwriters are given a 
ranking based on their bracket, with a few minor adjustments. Other underwriters not included 
in the Goldman Sachs prospectus are assigned a ranking of 1 or 2 if they were penny stock 
underwriters that had been subject to enforcement actions by the SEC during 1995-1999 (the 
information on enforcement actions was provided by the Chicago office of the SEC’s Division 
of Enforcement). 
The numerical reputation ranking of remaining underwriters was determined by Bruce 
Foerster of South Beach Capital in Miami. Foerster has been an investment banker for close 
to 30 years, participating in the underwriting of 150 IPOs and hundreds of other transactions 
while a managing director at A.G. Becker Paribas, Paine Webber, Lehman Brothers, and South 
Beach Capital. He is also the editor of the Securities Industry Association’s Capital Markets 
Handbook (Foerster, 2004), and has an encyclopedic knowledge of the investment banking 
industry during the last few decades. For the handful of other underwriters that Bruce 
Foerster was not familiar with and that were not identified in our other procedures, we assign 
a rank based on the offer price of IPOs that they underwrote, with penny stock underwriters 
earning the lowest ranks. Loughran & Ritter • Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?  35 
We made several alterations to the Carter and Manaster rankings for 1980-1984 and the 
Carter, Dark, and Singh rankings for 1985-1991. Carter, Dark, and Singh assign Hambrecht & 
Quist a 9.0, which we lower to 8.1. Carter and Manaster assign a rank of 2.0 to D.H. Blair in the 
1980-1984 period, and Carter, Dark, and Singh assign it a rank of 8.0 to D.H. Blair during 1985- 
1991. We assign a 4.1 to D.H. Blair for all years. A potential flaw in the Carter and Manaster 
methodology is that a penny stock underwriter that is never allowed into a syndicate of 
reputable underwriters might never be in a low bracket. Our judgment methodology avoids 
this problem. Note that we make very few changes in rankings. 
All of the rankings we assign are integers followed by a 0.1 (1.1 up to 9.1). We attach a 0.1 
to all our rankings so that other researchers can easily distinguish between our rankings and 
those from Carter and Manaster and Carter, Dark, and Singh, which never end with a 0.1. To 
use our rankings in empirical work, we recommend using “if then” commands to covert the 
x.1 rankings to x.0. 
Appendix D. Internet and Technology Firms 
To identify IPOs that are internet-related at the time of their offer, we merge the internet 
identifications of Thomson Financial Securities Data, Dealogic, and IPOMonitor.com. In 
1998, Securities Data classified only 18 IPOs as internet stocks, omitting such firms as uBID, 
Ticketmaster Online/Citysearch, NetGravity, and Verio. IPOMonitor.com classified 27 IPOs 
from 1998 as internet stocks, but omitted Cdnow and Interactive Magic, among others. Since 
these sources generally did not backdate the identification of early internet companies, we 
assign a “1” value to America On-Line, Spyglass, and Netscape. 
The classifications have some inherent arbitrariness. For example, Storage Area Network 
(SAN) companies and telecommunications companies are not internet stocks; nor are such 
IPOs as VA Linux and Perot Systems. 
SDC identifies two IPOs from the 1980s as internet firms: IPC Communications, a 
manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, and McClatchey Newspapers, which offered 
on-line services. 
Tech stocks are defined as those in SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer 
hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 
3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and 
controlling devices), 3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 
4899 (communications services), and 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 (software). 
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